Mr CADMAN  (Mitchell) (10.46 a.m.) —In debating the Aviation Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2000 I wish also to pursue the topic of airports, and nothing has been more topical in Sydney for many years than Sydney's airport needs. I vaguely remember, perhaps 30-odd years ago, a very big debate reported in the press where the then Prime Minister, Billy McMahon, and other members of the parliament were proposing various sites for Sydney's airport needs, and sites in Western Sydney—strongly opposed at that time by the Australian Labor Party—and Taren Point were mentioned. No decision was made. Then with the election of the Whitlam government the most notable thing I remember was the then Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, saying to the people of Galston that they would get Galston. That produced a very interesting political fallout for the Australian Labor Party in my local area. In fact, it resulted in a by-election which bought Philip Ruddock, the now Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Minister for Reconciliation and Aboriginal Affairs, into this parliament and eventually a change from the Labor Party in 1974 in Mitchell.

Sydney's airport needs has been a vexed question for all political parties, and there have been shifts in attitudes. Whilst I intend to be critical of my opponents, because I think that there have been double standards from the Australian Labor Party, anybody would be foolish to suggest that this is not a difficult decision. There is the built-up conurbation of Sydney, the appropriate selection of the site—if the decision is to build a second airport—the future development of Sydney (Kingsford Smith) Airport, and the demand by international travellers that Sydney must be the gateway to their entry to Australia, which may rankle with those citizens of other states but is just a physical factor and a demand factor that is driven by the market and the requirements of international travellers that Sydney be their first point of entry. I guess there is Sydney Harbour and the Opera House—a whole series of reasons why that may be.

The airport demands and the aircraft movements in Sydney have grown significantly ahead of those in other states. One of the first things Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser did at the time was to raise these issues with the then Premier of New South Wales, Neville Wran. And the Commonwealth instigated a study called `The Major Airport Needs of Sydney', the MANS study, which resulted in a report—from which the state withdrew part way through, by the way—that concluded that an extra parallel close-spaced runway should be built at Mascot and land reserved for a second airport, and the preferred site was Badgerys Creek.

Mr Wran was of the opinion that it was not within the state's interest to build the close-spaced parallel runway at Mascot but preferred to opt for Badgerys Creek. I remember Peter Morris, the then Minister for Transport, announced in 1983 that the Australian Labor Party would abandon the close-spaced parallel runway and would identify a spot for a second major airport. That was basically the position of both parties, except the coalition said that as an interim measure the close-spaced parallel runway needed to be built and that would take the pressure off the need for immediate action on a very expensive second international airport somewhere in Western Sydney, probably at Badgerys Creek. In 1982 the Hon. Wal Fife, the then Minister for Aviation, formally announced that that was the coalition's intention.

Over time the then minister, Peter Morris, and the cabinet adopted the decision that a close-spaced parallel runway should be built, and in March 1989 that resulted in the resignation of Gary Punch, who was Minister for Telecommunications and Aviation Support. Mr Punch could not accept the cabinet decision and his statement in the House—and I rely on the Parliamentary Library here—accused the environmental impact study consultants of a predetermined result on the close-spaced parallel runway.

I know that my friend and colleague at the table the current member for Barton will remember these issues with great clarity. I have enjoyed a similar relationship with both the current member and with Gary Punch—it was a very friendly relationship. There were political differences, of course, but there was goodwill with the differences.

On 13 November 1991, the cabinet gave the go-ahead to the construction of the third runway and, at the same time, increased funding for the purchase of land at Badgerys Creek. That brings us basically to the time of the election of the current government in 1996. Before passing on to the period since that, I seek leave of the House to table a summary of these chronological events produced by the Parliamentary Library.

Leave granted.

Mr CADMAN —I am very happy with that decision and the cooperation of the House. In 1996, John Sharp, as Minister for Transport and Regional Development, announced that the government of the day would fulfil its obligations and that Sydney and Sydney west would be withdrawn from the airport leasing process until there was a solution to aircraft noise issues there. The east-west runway would be opened and a full environmental impact study would be undertaken on Sydney west airport—Badgerys Creek. The coalition felt that it had been some time since an EIS had been done on Western Sydney and that it was needed. It was a commitment prior to the election. The decision to build Sydney's third runway produced some unexpected opposition after 1996. We saw members of the Labor Party who had previously endorsed a government position to build the east-west runway suddenly deciding that they would take the opportunity to change their minds and oppose it. A similar thing happened in Western Sydney, with the member for Chifley and others withdrawing support for a second airport at Badgerys Creek—a job creator, a benefit to the people of Western Sydney, a substitute for the cuts that had taken place to establishments like HMAS Nirimba and other government establishments which were really important to employment creation in Western Sydney. Those members of the Australian Labor Party suddenly decided that with the election of a new government they would oppose the building of an airport at Badgerys Creek.

That change in attitude created chaos in local government through the WESROC organisation and amongst community groups. It has been my view that the people in Western Sydney have consistently felt—for all the time that I have known them, which is some time as a member of parliament but before that as well; I guess the period ranges over 30 years—that they do not want an airport dumped on their doorstep by any government. It did not matter whether it was in the days of Les Irwin and John Armitage or whether it was when Paul Keating was at Bankstown and we did not hold the seats of Western Sydney—it has been a consistent view. But somehow or other during the 1980s and early 1990s, the Australian Labor Party were able to convince their members and the local government authorities they controlled in Western Sydney that an airport in Western Sydney would be good for the people of Western Sydney. They reverted to their true views with the election of a coalition government.

The coalition has had to confront some difficult issues with regard to the airport. First of all, they were historically committed to a runway, which the Australian Labor Party ultimately built at some political cost. They were also committed then to study again the need to build a second airport at Badgerys Creek, while still being committed to solving the problems of the airport needs of Sydney, a commitment originally made by Malcolm Fraser and Wal Fife. This continued as a theme right through opposition and into government in 1996. So what do we have? First we have a minister for aviation, the Hon. John Sharp, introducing a bill called the Airports Transitional Bill 1996 which opened the east-west runway, giving Sydney Kingsford Smith the use of three runways, with a full EIS undertaken on Sydney west airport. The result of that decision was to produce a report which was released finally by John Anderson as Minister for Transport and Regional Development on 30 June 1999. That is the full report and the environmental impact statement for the proposed second Sydney airport at Badgerys Creek. First of all, a site was identified from various competing sites and Badgerys Creek was settled upon as being the most suitable option for a second Sydney airport. There were a number of configurations for runways and some slight variations on site in Badgerys Creek. The EIS was finally produced in June 1999. The government was then confronted with a decision as to what they would do about the airport needs of Sydney. The minister at that time, John Anderson, said

The environmental impact statement is a very detailed analysis of the environmental impacts of a major airport at Badgerys Creek. It certainly is the most comprehensive environmental assessment of any transport infrastructure proposal in Australian history. The government has fulfilled its promise to conduct a rigorous and transparent EIS into the Badgerys Creek proposal.

This EIS did not satisfy the people of Western Sydney or the councils. I pay tribute to and draw attention to people such as Allan Ezzy from Holroyd City Council, who was mayor at that time and has followed this issue strongly. Mrs Kay Vella is another name I remember. They consistently opposed the construction of an airport in Western Sydney, despite the hypocrisy of the Australian Labor Party. It can be called nothing else because members representing Western Sydney led their constituents to believe that they were opposed to construction of an airport. Suddenly, with the election of an Australian Labor Party government, they were in favour of an airport in Western Sydney. With the election of a coalition government, again they were against an airport. So it is no wonder that the people of Western Sydney were confused and rejected this opportunism.

The decision announced recently by the current government was made after assessment of all of the environmental impact statements, the future needs of Sydney and the difficulty of constructing an airport so far from the major airport in Sydney, Sydney (Kingsford Smith) Airport. The prospect of transporting people through Sydney traffic from one major airport to another, trying to encourage people to use Badgerys Creek, whether they be people from the regions or international travellers, the complexity of building infrastructure for road and rail transport, the provision of water services and the impact of the Western Sydney orbital have all been considered by the government. I point out to the House the consistent application of coalition governments to this difficult problem and their ability, point by point, to produce solutions. Going back as far as I can remember in political terms to the early 1970s and right through the 1980s, coalition governments have displayed a consistent application of purpose and the need for a result for Sydney which took the views of the people of Western Sydney into careful consideration.

It is not the purpose of this government to construct an airport at Badgerys Creek. That decision has been made. I know that while some residents of Blacktown, Penrith, Windsor, Richmond, the Blue Mountains, Campbelltown and further south may have favoured it, generally the view was that the government should not construct an airport at Badgerys Creek, for a number of reasons. Some reasons were environmental, with additional smog and deterioration of air quality—CSIRO reports from years ago were verified by the environmental impact statement. It would not be aircraft causing a smog problem but the increase in motor vehicle traffic which would result around an airport, in an area where there are air inversion currents which would produce the sort of continuous, year-round smog typical of Los Angeles. Another reason was the disruption to their lifestyle and the noise that an airport would create. Residents realised that most of the jobs would not be created for locals, that people would have to be brought into the area and that there would be only menial jobs for local people. They were wise enough and shrewd enough to know that, on balance, no real advantages would come from an airport at Badgerys Creek.

There are a number of arguments against the construction of Badgerys Creek, some environmental, some economic and some sheer commonsense transport infrastructure management decisions. The decision of this government is to maximise the use of Sydney (Kingsford Smith) Airport. The Sydney Olympic Games indicated what our personal best at Sydney (Kingsford Smith) Airport could be. Despite massive increases in air movements, Australia handled twice the number of passengers through Sydney (Kingsford Smith) Airport that we have attempted to handle ever before, without chaos and without difficulty. Before the Olympic Games, Sydney (Kingsford Smith) Airport had not been tested to its maximum and there is reserve capacity which can be called on. The capacity for people of Sydney to be serviced by Sydney (Kingsford Smith) Airport continues without breaching the curfew or creating difficulties for people living in the immediate vicinity.

Down the track, perhaps there will need to be some changes. As those changes occur, the government's decision is to upgrade Bankstown airport, providing better passenger facilities and links between Bankstown airport and the CBD, upgrading Bankstown airport's links into the main road, rail and air transport grids. I am very pleased with this decision. I think it was the only commonsense decision that could be arrived at which will meet the future needs of Sydney for a predictably long time. The figures I have seen on the growth in air movements and passenger numbers through Sydney indicate that the government's decision should see a satisfactory movement of passengers, retaining Sydney as the number one gateway for Australia well into the 2020s. I congratulate the government. This has been a hard passage and was a difficult decision, but it is a good one. (Time expired)

Mr MURPHY  (Lowe) (11.06 a.m.) —With great respect to the member for Mitchell, for whom I have some regard, on this particular topic we have just listened to a monumental triumph for double standards and hypocrisy. You were a member of the opposition before 1996, Mr Cadman—

Mr Cadman —You weren't even here.

Mr MURPHY —No, but you were a member of the opposition and you were consistently berating the Australian Labor Party in government about when the government was going to build Badgerys Creek and give people some relief from aircraft noise. The hypocrisy of the decision that was made just before Christmas, against a litany of broken promises, to visit more environmental health and safety risks on the people of Sydney in the interests of flogging off that airport and never building a second airport is absolutely breathtaking. That just cannot be allowed to pass—it is incredible. In fact, you participated in the debate on Wednesday, 29 May 1996 and you said:

Now we are going to do a study of Holsworthy. We will do a study of Badgerys Creek and Sydney will get its best airport. When the minister has finished having the best and most efficient use made of Sydney's Kingsford Smith airport, we will find there is adequate capacity for this process to go through and for a second airport to be constructed in good time.

You stand or fall by your own words.

The Aviation Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2000 concerns the significant policy issue of aircraft safety. In addressing aircraft safety, the government seeks to draft this bill to ratify domestic law consistent with Australia's obligations under the Convention on International Civil Aviation, done at Chicago on 7 December 1994. As Bills Digest No. 164 states:

The Chicago Convention makes a country responsible for the safety regulation of aircraft registered in that country, wherever in the world the aircraft is situated.

The bill makes substantive changes to the mental element of offences contained in the existing act. The purpose of this bill is then explained in the explanatory memorandum, together with a supplementary explanatory memorandum and a correction to the supplementary explanatory memorandum. In a nutshell, this bill and its explanatory memoranda are designed to assist in the statutory interpretation of the act. However, aircraft safety involves much more than this bill alone. For example, the Air Services Act 1995 states, in subsection 9 (1):

In exercising its powers and performing its functions, Airservices Australia must regard the safety of air navigation as the most important consideration.

There is no doubt, then, that the current government is determined to amend legislation to achieve two key objectives. The first is to implement domestic legislation with respect to civil aviation safety and the second is to fulfil Australia's obligations as a signatory to an international instrument's obligations.

How does this government rate in the overall strategic planning of aircraft safety in Australia? I note that the Chicago convention deals with Australian registered aircraft in Australia and abroad. A material factor in aircraft safety in Australia alone is the physical environment in which aircraft fly. The issue of aircraft safety is similar to the issue of road safety in many ways. Yes, there is the central issue of the culpability of the driver of a motor vehicle. By analogy, this bill deals with the criminality of the driver of the car, as it were. However, as insurance companies will tell you, as will the civil court administrations throughout the states and territories, liability is not restricted solely to the driver's culpability. Other factors come into play, such as the physical condition of the roads, that is, the medium in which the cars travel. Not only must good roads be physically sound and built to prescribed standards but travel along them must also be regulated in the strictest sense to ensure maximum safety. That is why this government and state and territory governments spend billions upon billions of dollars each year to do their part in minimising harm to persons and property by making our roads safer for those motor vehicle drivers.

The relevance of this analogy is immediately apparent in the bill before the House this morning. We have a bill that, in its utter hypocrisy and denial, flies in the face of the strategic decision making by this government with respect to aircraft safety in Australia. No bill, no act, can be read in isolation. There is a legal maxim that states, `The law always speaks.' This rule means that all law is to be read in cognate; that is, all law is read together. There is no priority of law unless specific provision is made there, and even then there are interpretational difficulties. Bills such as this seek to overcome statutory interpretational difficulties, yet the broader related laws and this government's publicly declared decisions not only send mixed messages and conflicting laws but also are dangerous decisions in terms of aircraft safety. I am dumbfounded by the Howard government in making policies and then publicly declaring decisions that can only be described as a contemptuous disregard for this bill.

This bill, combined with the current government policies on enforcement of aircraft safety management, affects the management of Australia's busiest airports, namely, Sydney (Kingsford Smith) and Bankstown airports. These two airports are by far the busiest airports in Australia. Bankstown manages 420,000 aircraft movements per year. By comparison, Sydney airport is world renowned as the premier destination airport for international travellers, and for this reason is Australia's largest international port of entry. This bill cannot be of greater relevance to the ultimate impact of aircraft safety than to these two airports.

What are these government policies to which I refer? I first turn to the media statement of the Minister for Finance and Administration, Mr John Fahey, No. 03/01, titled `Appointment of advisers to conduct the Sydney airports scoping study'. Mr Fahey says:

The Minister for Finance and Administration ... today announced the appointment of the investment bank Salomon Smith Barney and the law firm Freehills to conduct the scoping study into the sale of the Sydney Basin airports at Kingsford Smith, Bankstown, Camden and Hoxton Park.

This scoping study is in preparation for privatisation and sale of all four airports. Further, the plan goes that Bankstown Airport is to be an overflow airport for Sydney airport. This announcement makes a mockery of today's bill. Bankstown and Sydney airports are too close to each other. I see that the member for Blaxland has just come into the chamber, and I am sure that he will have something to say shortly about Bankstown. The operation of jet aircraft from Bankstown means that the east-west runway of Sydney airport must close permanently if aircraft safety is to be preserved and not place an unreasonable burden on pilots and the aviation industry. It is an unreasonable expectation that the Civil Aviation Authority can fulfil its international obligations towards aircraft safety whilst this government is pursuing these policies of madness about Sydney, Bankstown and the other two Sydney Basin airports. By definition, those airports, once privatised, will seek to operate at maximum profit.

The logical conclusion is that aircraft safety will be fundamentally compromised. Strategically, Bankstown is a worse decision than even Holsworthy was, for entirely the same reasons as Holsworthy—that is, Holsworthy was too close to Bankstown and, for the purposes of Bankstown as a jet aircraft airport, it is in turn too close to Sydney airport. So how is the government today fulfilling its international obligation towards aircraft safety? It is attempting to do so by enacting legislation whilst in environmental terms making aircraft safety in the Sydney basin a catastrophe waiting to happen. The decision to make Bankstown airport an overflow airport while simultaneously increasing the capacity of Sydney airport is the functional equivalent of the New South Wales Roads and Traffic Authority deliberately punching large potholes in the roads in order to induce an incident.

One needs only to refer to the second reading speech on the Airports Bill 1996 made on 29 May 1996 by the then Minister for Transport and Regional Services, the Hon. John Sharp, in order to see how the priority of this government has shifted from one of aircraft safety to sheer profiteering. I hope that the member for Mitchell is listening. I quote from the minister's speech at page 1658:

No sales should occur until all Environmental Impact Statements processes are completed and the future of Sydney West Airport is resolved. We are determined not to sell Sydney Mascot and Sydney West Airport until such time as we have satisfactorily completed the environmental impact studies and decisions are made in relation to that. We will not be putting on the market Sydney Mascot and Sydney West Airports until such time as we fulfil our election commitment, made by the former shadow minister for aviation, Senator Parer—and indeed reiterated by the now Prime Minister (Mr Howard), then opposition leader—that we will not do so—

sell the airports—

until such time as we have been able to satisfactorily resolve Sydney's aircraft noise problems.

Ha, ha! The minister goes on to say:

So we would say that the best way to deal with this issue is to exclude Sydney's airport from the sale process at this time, deal with the second airport problem, deal with the aircraft noise problem—which is also a factor that impacts on the potential value of Sydney's airports—and, once you have dealt with those satisfactorily, then put them on the market and you will achieve the highest possible value for those airports when you put them up for sale. So we believe that that is the appropriate approach to achieve the goal of obtaining the highest value for Sydney's airports.

Ha, ha! There you have a have it: a total, complete, 180-degree backflip by the Howard government in the space of just over three years.

What is this to do with the bill before us today? I will tell you. The answer is everything. Flying in the face of the Howard government's declared statements of 1996, as I have just read out, the decisions of the government in the year 2000 on the Sydney basin airports are as follows. Badgerys Creek has been shelved. The Rust PPK consultants' report and preliminary EIS for that airport are therefore obsolete, if we believe this government. There is no EIS on the impacts of Bankstown Airport as an overflow airport pursuant to the provisions of the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999. A future EIS must comply with the EPBC Act, which includes substantive provisions dealing with, inter alia, location and other relevant factors as prescribed in the act's regulations. There is no EIS on the impact of Bankstown airport in its newfound role, including, for that matter, the interaction between Bankstown, Sydney, Camden and Hoxton Park airports, including aircraft safety impacts.

I note that the second reading debate on the Airports Bill 1996 spanned two full days in this parliament, on 28 and 29 May 1996. There are over 50 pages of Hansard on the 29 May 1996 debate alone. I note that the minister berated the Australian Labor Party for its lack of direction in airport management when he said:

What had happened by June 1995? Absolutely and utterly nothing. Not a sod had been turned, not a runway had been built and not a building had been constructed on the site that was supposed to be an operating airport by June 1995.

Ha, ha, ha! Are these not the government's famous last words? Is it our turn to say to Mr Anderson that `not a runway has been built and not a building has been constructed on the site that was supposed to be an operating airport'? Are not all the government statements and promises just empty promises and vain rhetoric?

I put to the government four propositions: first, I put to the government that aircraft safety is not the ultimate priority of this government. Second, I put to the government that, as I said in my speech on Tuesday evening last, the Prime Minister and the minister for transport waited until five days after the start of the Christmas recess last year—that is, until 13 December 2000—to proudly announce what everyone affected by aircraft noise and safety in Sydney dreaded, the expansion of Sydney airport and the role of Bankstown as the overflow airport. Welcome to the chamber, Mr Speaker. I know your interest in this topic because you have listened to me ad nauseam over the last 2¼ years. Third, I put to the government that they cannot draft this bill and reasonably expect to create an environment of aircraft safety by the concomitant decisions they have made on the expansion and location of Sydney's airports. Fourth, I put to the government that they have decided to sell Sydney (Kingsford Smith) Airport by erasing aircraft safety from the $4.5 billion sale price. Complicity is in order here. The conduct of the Sydney Airport Corporation is being noticed in the deliberate pursuit of profit maximisation at the cost of safety by erasure of its safety obligations.

The bill is far more than about meeting criminal culpability criterion. This bill is consistent with its privatisation platform of leasing these airports for the highest price. This price is now being achieved by the very elimination of those environmental responsibilities that would lower the price through creating the Pareto optimum environmental limits that place caps on the movement of aircraft at these airports. For these reasons, this government is clearly uninterested in the sale of the airports without any recognised environmental impacts which may adversely affect the price.

In doing so, the Howard government has relied on a fundamental misapplication of the precautionary principle of which I have spoken in this House on many previous occasions. The shadow Attorney-General, who is sitting at the table here, has also spoken on this at length. Again and again I have been required to correct this government's misapplication of this principle. The government says, erroneously, that if a link cannot be proved, then there is no risk at all and hence the precautionary principle does not apply.

Rather than see the imminent link between aircraft safety and operating Bankstown and the other airports as overflow airports for Sydney airport, this government is culpably denying the existence of the problem. Instead, this government chooses to rely on the false reasoning that the absence of full scientific certainty means there is no known risk and hence the proposals, as declared by the Prime Minister on 13 December 2000, can be put into operation with impunity. How misguided the Prime Minister is. The effect on this bill is at once immediate. Those who are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Aviation Act 1988 and the Air Services Act are bound to these provisions. They are forced to drive on a road that is being torn up before their eyes and laced with every road hazard imaginable. The risk of damage to life and property is very high and increasing, thanks to this government's policies. The government chooses to ignore this risk-harm link.

In any event, I understand that the Department of Transport and Regional Services is well aware of the risks associated with the use of Bankstown airport in the Sydney basin in a scenario of an expanding Sydney airport. It is sheer madness. The government have demonstrated their contempt towards the Australian people and the aircraft industry by their compounded decisions of deceit and hypocrisy, as demonstrated in their second reading speech and most of all by their recent conduct. The government, rather than increasing aircraft safety, are endangering the lives of Sydney residents in the entire basin. The cumulative impact of their decisions cannot mean anything other than a fundamental decrease in aircraft safety over the skies of Sydney.

Why is the government doing this? The probable reason is that to sell Bankstown as an overflow airport for jet aircraft means more potential profitability for that airport once privatised, and hence the government is talking up the price. The same is true of Hoxton Park and Camden airports. The Sydney Airport Corporation and the airline carriers have much to be answerable for in influencing government policy in this direction. The responsibility for injury, death and loss of life will fall on their heads for the decisions made during the term of the government. With Sydney airport the Howard government is totally ignoring its own legislation in the form of the Airports Act 1996, particularly the provisions of division 3 which require the joint lease of Sydney (Kingsford Smith) Airport and Sydney West airport to the same lessee. Again, all the provisions of that 1996 legislation are conveniently forgotten in light of the 13 December 2000 announcement. Hence my stack of questions on this topic in the Notice Paper on Tuesday last. It is a case of selective amnesia.

The people of Sydney cannot but feel truly disillusioned with the government's approach to aircraft safety. The government is saying one thing but doing another. The adverse effects of aircraft safety in Australia are already being seen in so many ways: defective planes, near misses and serious faults. All these go to a plethora of diminished standards. Add to this the very inaction that the Australian Labor Party was berated by this government for in terms of its alleged inaction over Badgerys and the government's hypocrisy is complete. Not only did the now Minister for Finance and Administration and former Treasurer in New South Wales, the Hon. John Fahey, have a significant hand in preventing Badgerys Creek from progressing; he is now content to sell off Sydney (Kingsford Smith) Airport in violation of the Airports Act. This government has had no reason for making such statements about Badgerys unless it was committed to building an airport there. Instead, this government has totally abandoned Badgerys. It has decided on an airport at Bankstown totally out of the blue.

I conclude with the words of the member for Parramatta, Mr Ross Cameron, who also spoke on the airports bill of 1996. On 29 May 1996 he said:

It is very seldom that a democratic government gets 10 years to implement a major infrastructure project.

Ha, ha! This government has now had five years. After being berated by the now government when they were in opposition to get on with Badgerys Creek, we have had the Badgerys Creek-Holsworthy EIS debacle, followed by the more ludicrous Kurnell Peninsula proposal and now the totally preposterous Bankstown airport proposal. This is disastrous. This government has misled the public about its intentions. It has deceived the public and, perhaps worst of all, generated false hope after false hope. It is my belief that the government is in the business of creating red herrings to distract attention from the real issue of dealing with Sydney's problems of aircraft noise. It does this to maximise its profits—that is the only real agenda.

This bill is a mockery of everything this government has said it stands for in respect of aircraft safety. In light of its statements, as quoted earlier in this chamber by me, this government stands on its own record, its own words and its own actions for its betrayal and hypocrisy in its determination to expose the residents of Sydney to a level of risk from aircraft injury that is totally out of proportion with the proposed measures towards aircraft safety in the Sydney basin. (Time expired)

Debate (on motion by Mr Anthony) adjourned.

Mr HATTON  (Blaxland) (11.42 a.m.) —I have with me a copy of the Bills Digest in relation to the Aviation Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2000. It outlines the Civil Aviation Safety Organisation's updated provisions. Essentially, I could take this Bills Digest, rip it into small pieces, give it to someone and say that it can be used as confetti, because the government's recent decision on Sydney's second airport means that all of the provisions in the bill are null and void. The bill will pass through this House, and no doubt the government will proceed to have it pass through the Senate, when there will be simply no operation possible because of the inanity of the decision taken in the middle of December last year.

It is quite clear from a document that cost $14 million to produce—an environmental impact statement into the need for a second airport for Sydney—that that is the case. The statement pointed out that any move towards expanding Bankstown airport to take either regional aircraft or other aircraft, including possibly B737 aircraft, would be absolutely impossible. The cabinet does not say that, but the people who wrote the environmental impact statement do argue that, quite rightly. If the airport were to take regional aircraft, the provisions of this bill would stand completely null and void. The long-term operating plan for Sydney is dead as of 13 December 2000 because the relationship between Bankstown airport and Kingsford Smith goes to the heart of how that plan could operate. Effectively, what the government did on 13 December was to announce that not only would it sell Bankstown, Camden and Hoxton Park airports as a job lot, separate from Kingsford Smith, but also that Bankstown should become the new international airport for Sydney. What kind of lunacy is this? Only the lunacy that could emerge from the federal coalition cabinet, attempting to answer the question: how don't we build a second airport for Sydney?

When we look at the elements of the decision on this matter, we find it is one of the most extraordinary decisions to have emerged from any cabinet at any time about any issue. In relation to transport issues for Sydney, it is simply unbelievable. A large proportion of people in Sydney just do not believe that the government is serious about this decision. They do not believe that any sane, sensible government could actually think that they could turn Bankstown airport into an international jet way, which is what is being proposed by the Prime Minister. It is not just that they might have a bit of an overflow situation; that when things get a bit difficult for Kingsford Smith they might move a few regional aircraft over there or, on a tight day when the 80 an hour is under a bit of a threat, that a B737 might roll in. `It is a big aircraft, isn't it? It is more than 60 tonnes. Bankstown can only take 50 tonnes. But, at a stretch, Bankstown is an overflow and we will just run it in, let those people alight at Bankstown and then they can grab a taxi, whip into the city and see how they go.' That seems to be the attitude informing the so-called `cabinet decision'. People naturally say, `It is not on. They cannot do it. They are not really serious about this. We should not take much notice of it because there must be a real decision coming down the track. Anyway, they said Kurnell should be a place for another runway and they said Holsworthy. They said all sorts of other things.'

Bankstown airport is bang in the centre of the electorate of Blaxland. The member for Banks is directly affected as well because his electorate abuts my electorate. The electorate of the previous speaker, the member for Lowe, John Murphy, is directly impacted by the changes that are proposed for Bankstown airport. The core of those changes, and the direct effect in relation to the member for Lowe, is that there would be more jet traffic coming out of Kingsford Smith every hour. That is inexorable. That is what is at the bottom of this.

Who else is directly affected? Who else is concerned to put the word directly to their electorate that there is a dramatic impact from this insane set of decisions? There is a direct impact on the member for Fowler. The member for Fowler has been very vocal in condemning the stupidity of this decision. The member for Barton is directly affected. The people in the electorate of the member for Prospect are directly affected. The people in the electorate of the member for Reid are directly affected. You would think that no-one with any modicum of sanity, with any sense at all, could actually think that the fourth runway for Sydney airport—because that is what we are looking at here—could be built at Bankstown, a fourth jet way. What has the Prime Minister said? What has the Minister for Transport and Regional Services said? They want to sell Bankstown airport but they want to make it a specific provision that the main runway at Bankstown airport is extended and that it takes jets like 737s.

When I first heard it I thought, `They are just a bunch of loons. They are completely stupid. They have gone way round the twist. They just cannot do it.' Given the fact that they have been digging up information for the last 18 months out at Bankstown airport, how could they get it so wrong? I found out a few things in the last little while between that decision and this, and I think I can now work out what informed the decision they made. There is a special provision that we only found out about a while ago. There is a grandfather clause for Boeing 737 jets. That grandfather clause says that Boeing 737s can land on and use 30-metre-wide runways. Other aircraft of the same type and nature, with less weight and with less passenger capacity, cannot—but the Boeing 737s can.

So it seems to me that the Prime Minister and the minister and the cabinet are reliant upon that grandfather clause to say, `At Bankstown airport there are three runways—two 30-metre-wide runways and an 18-metre-wide runway. We will take the central one. That can be expanded. The land is already there. Make them lengthen the runway. The government should not do it, by the way.' That is what they are arguing. `Let them flog it off straight away, as soon as they can. Let the private owner take the chance that they might have to go through a two- to three-year period undertaking an environmental impact statement, undertaking community consultation processes, undertaking the most detailed consideration.'

We have had a detailed consideration in relation to the need for a second airport in Sydney. It was called the environmental impact statement. It related to Badgerys Creek. The former minister, John Sharp, included Holsworthy. `Just throw in Holsworthy airport; let us have a bit of a look at that and see if that can have a run as well—delay things a bit, get us beyond the last election.' That cost $14 million. What notice did federal cabinet take of that? Not one little bit, except for a couple of parts. In particular, the environmental impact statement `supplement' makes very interesting reading. It is after the audit, after everything else. It is looking at considerations. It is looking at a range of submissions that were put in by vested interest groups that want to see the dramatic expansion of Kingsford Smith airport, vested interest groups that want to see regional aircraft put over to Bankstown, vested interest groups that want to see a fourth international jet runway for Kingsford Smith operating at Bankstown airport, vested interest groups that do not care about the noise impact on more than half a million people from that kind of change.

These vested interest groups do not care that the people in Bankstown Hospital would have 737 jets running right over the top of them. I know because I lived near the hospital for nearly 10 years. I lived where the general aviation aircraft banked left and right as they took off, and banked left and right coming back in to land over the top. I was about 300 metres from the hospital. If you go into Bankstown Hospital for a bit of rest and recuperation, or if you are in the intensive care unit of Bankstown hospital, I do not think that an 8 o'clock morning run through for a 737 jet landing at Bankstown directly over the top of the hospital is going to be the doctor's prescription for how you should rebuild your life in Bankstown. But I know that the Prime Minister has absolutely no concern for and no care about the impact of this dumb, crazy, insane decision.

Mr Melham —He hates Bankstown.

Mr HATTON —The member for Banks is absolutely right. He has hated Bankstown throughout his entire career. He has wandered through the joint at will, attempting to defile the place because it is a strong Labor electorate. I have seen that happen time after time after time. Since I became the member for Blaxland, what have we seen happen to Bankstown? The government have attempted to totally close down the department of taxation at a cost of about $22 million to the Commonwealth in money spent on dead rent. They could not achieve it. They had to leave 220 people in it. They could not take everybody out and now they have had to refill it with GST taxation police. But they still tried to do it. What they have achieved, of course, is to take the department of immigration totally out of Bankstown. They have sent them off to Hurstville and Parramatta—their preferred places—and the city, and they have made sure that the people of Bankstown have as little help from the Commonwealth as possible.

Mr Lee —Why does he hate Bankstown?

Mr HATTON —I think he has just punished us, mate, because we are too strong a Labor seat. We did produce a few Bankstown boys who have done a few things. We had a former Prime Minister—the former member for Blaxland Paul Keating—who thumped Howard, the current Prime Minister, time and time again and belted the daylights out of him. But the viciousness with which Bankstown has been attacked by this government is unbelievable. I have nothing against the people of Bennelong. I do not want aircraft ripping over the top of the people in the Bennelong funnel all the time. But I do not think it is proper for a government to make a decision that will impact directly on people's lives on the basis of the colour of the vote in a particular area.

From 1942 the people of Bankstown grew up around Bankstown airport. We had the busiest general aviation airport in the entire Southern Hemisphere with more than 400,000 movements a year. The whole strength and purpose of the direct 1,500 jobs in general aviation at Bankstown are imperilled by this decision that was taken in the middle of December. There is no certain future for that entire industry—the biggest business in Bankstown. Do the government want to close that down as well as trying to close down all the other Commonwealth facilities? They have prejudiced the entire future of the airport, the biggest business in the whole of Bankstown. There are 4,500 jobs associated with that airport—1,500 directly in relation to general aviation, 1,500 at the de Havilland facility, which has just recently been bought out by Boeing, and another 1,500 jobs directly related to activity at the airport. There is a giant question mark over all of them, because a set of entirely inappropriate decisions were made about the future of Bankstown.

Most people in Bankstown support the continuation of those jobs as being the central part of the way things are done in Bankstown, a central part of the economy. The airport has been there long enough. There are some who do not want it, but they are in the minority. The vast number of people—the local council and the people around the area—have said, `Those jobs are important to us.' But they are important to us the way it was before. It should not be expanded and it should not be changed. It is a vital part of the economy of Sydney and it provides for general aviation that is not provided for elsewhere, except for what is provided at Hoxton Park and Camden. You cannot take those general aviation planes out and just put them anywhere else. They closed Schofields airport years ago. There is only Hoxton Park airport and Camden airport. These activities have to go somewhere. They are major earners of income from people overseas who come to Bankstown to train—to learn how to fly aircraft and helicopters. It is a major source of foreign income for the local area and for the country.

If you look at the entire set of decisions, you actually get to the position where what was adopted was the do-nothing option. This government is very good at adopting a do-nothing approach, but the environmental impact statement supplement was quite clear. There are strategic alternatives to actually making a set of decisions about a second airport for Sydney and they include the do-nothing option—that is, allowing the capacity of Sydney airport to expand under current operational and broad policy settings. That is the core of what has happened here—do nothing; reserve Badgerys Creek but do not do anything at all and advance the argument, which is a pure and total lie, that Sydney airport will not really come under pressure at all for years and years because it worked so well during the Olympics.

What happened during the Olympics has zero to do with the way the airport actually works. Anyone who drove around Sydney during the Olympics would have found that the road traffic was something like we have not seen for 30 or 40 years: you could get anywhere you wanted to. Basically, people did not drive; they went off to Olympic events. Trucks were made to use the city at night, so all the deliveries were done overnight and we did not have the pressure on the roads that there normally is. They were abnormal circumstances. There was a substitution of normal passengers with Olympic passengers. So it is not a guide.

But the cabinet said, `It worked really well; therefore, the Sydney (Kingsford Smith) Airport can be expanded—it can go on for years and years—and Bankstown can be expanded, and we'll never really have to make a decision about this. We don't think we'll ever have to have a second airport for Sydney.' One of the outcomes of that kind of approach is that every other major city in Australia could end up picking up all the economic impact that there would be if there were a second airport for Sydney. Sydney could well lose its leading place, because this government did not have the courage to make a decision, on the back of a $14 million EIS, that it should have made. This government wanted to leave the whole thing over yet there is no real pressure whatsoever on any of the coalition seats that are really the basis for the decision. We are not dealing with a transport decision here, an aviation decision; we are dealing with a political decision driven by fear of losing seats in Western Sydney. George Paciullo, the Mayor of Liverpool, has pointed out time and time again that all the evidence in relation to any elections in Western Sydney going back for a long period of time in relation to airport issues indicates that, really, there is not a substantial attack against it.

But back to the key point: most people did not think this could happen, and that is one of the problems that we have. This is—and people need to understand this very clearly—a federal cabinet decision. Every department of the Commonwealth is bound to follow the instructions given by federal cabinet. The ministers have full power as a result of this decision to go out and sell Bankstown airport, to sell Kingsford Smith airport, to get the money in for this year's budget, to change the nature of aircraft usage in Sydney forever—to actually sell Bankstown airport with a rider that you have to extend the runway and that you have to put 737 aircraft in it. Two or three years down the track, when the government should be doing the EIS and should be doing the community consultations—and we actually require that the government should do that—if they get the private buyer to do it, at the end of the whole process we will be in a very interesting situation because after whatever has been done in that period of time a minister of the Commonwealth—a minister for transport and aviation—will make a decision. Despite whatever has happened during that process, that minister can simply say, `No, thank you very much, but we're not having the new master plan for Bankstown airport.'

There are already precedents for this. The current ministers of the coalition have twice rejected master plans for Coolangatta airport. Have they been twice rejected on the basis of transport needs and so on? Probably not. We can probably guess that the fact that the electorate of Richmond is close by and that pressure has been put on means there has been a political decision to actually stop the expansion of Coolangatta airport. So anyone who is foolish enough to buy Bankstown airport and think they can run it as an international jet way has got something coming. Anyone who thought that they could actually upgrade Bankstown significantly would have to think twice about that situation. The people of Bankstown and the surrounding areas are entirely against a stupid, insane, ridiculous upgrade to serve the political purposes of the coalition and they demand that this be stopped. (Time expired)

Mr MOSSFIELD  (Greenway) (12.02 p.m.) —I rise to speak on the Aviation Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2000. We have seen this bill before. It was first introduced in April last year and then withdrawn, like so many other pieces of legislation put by this government. The bill seeks to amend the Civil Aviation Act 1988 in a number of ways, firstly to introduce terminology which is consistent with that used by the International Civil Aviation Organisation. This is part of a worldwide push to standardise terminology in safety regulations and has come to us via a global rule harmonisation resolution which was passed by the International Civil Aviation Organisation. The bill also seeks to harmonise some of the criminal offences outlined in the act with the general principle of criminal responsibility as set out in the Commonwealth criminal code.

As the Bills Digest sets out, the offences amended by the bill all specify the mental state which is a component of the offence, namely, knowledge of recklessness. Essentially this may overturn centuries of legal precedent. Ignorance of the law is no defence: it has not been, in common law, for centuries. However, with this legislation that is wiped away. `I didn't know' now becomes a defence. If an aircraft takes off without a maintenance release and then crashes, for example, as long as no-one admits to knowing the aircraft did not have a maintenance release, it seems that under this bill CASA will have no power to act to suspend, vary or cancel the air operator's certificate. This is because the changes this bill makes mean the lack of knowledge results only in a non-compliance with the act and not a breach of the act. This is very important: the changes proposed would result in a non-compliance with the act and not a breach of the act. It may seem a fine distinction but it is a very important one from a legal standpoint.

This bill also seeks to enable CASA to enter into what is known as article 83bis agreements with other national airworthiness authorities. The Chicago convention makes a country responsible for the safety regulations of an aircraft registered in that country, wherever in the world the aircraft is situated. It is a bit like the flag of convenience of ships, although with tighter controls we do not see as many rusted hulks in the aircraft industry as we do in the maritime industry. Under this convention, the country where the aircraft is registered is responsible for issuing airworthiness certificates, certifying and licensing pilots, and approving technical equipment such as radio transmitters and so forth. Article 83bis of that convention allows countries to transfer all or some of these functions to another country if that is where the aircraft is principally located and operated.

This bill gives the right to CASA to engage in article 83bis agreements with other national aviation authorities. The concern with this schedule is that there are no criteria set down for CASA to follow when entering into such agreements. It gives, in effect, an unfettered power to CASA with little or no checks or balances. There is no legislative framework to check that agreements that CASA enters into will not result in a lower standard of maintenance for Australian registered aircraft. Australian standards of aircraft maintenance and safety are extremely high and we should ensure that countries given responsibility for Australian aircraft have similarly high standards. As this bill stands, that cannot be guaranteed. I believe this is a very serious deficiency in this legislation because worldwide Australia has been known for its air safety standards and I do not think we should risk our own standards deteriorating by being tied in to those of other organisations. Our reputation is worldwide. Some members of this House will recall the film Rain Man, which was produced in 1988 and starred Dustin Hoffman and Tom Cruise. Some may remember that Dustin Hoffman made some remark that Qantas never crashes, so here was the producers of an American film recognising the value of the standards of the Australian aircraft industry.

Another area of concern the opposition has with this bill is the issue of voluntary enforceable undertakings. A voluntary enforceable undertaking is a powerful regulatory tool that can be used as an alternative to prosecution. These undertakings have the full force of the law and can only be varied or withdrawn with CASA's consent, and they are enforceable through the Federal Court. We have seen such undertakings work in other industries, though we have also seen abuse. An example is the abuse of the private binding agreements issued by the Taxation Office that has created a number of tax avoidance schemes. The opposition does not have any in-principle opposition to voluntary enforceable undertakings, but we feel that CASA is simply not ready to assume that extra power. The Australian National Audit Office was highly critical of CASA's record on safety compliance. On the issue of voluntary enforceable undertakings, the audit report said, amongst other things:

... for undertakings to have any enduring significance they will need to be monitored by the responsible office. In the light of the ANAO's findings ... this will require improvement in the way CASA manages and prioritises tasks in its surveillance program ...

And:

... an effective quality control system is in place to ensure that the evidence is reliable, and that the quality of the inspection and audits from which the evidence is derived is consistent with the standards set by CASA.

In short, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority is not ready. It has no procedures or training in place for its staff and with respect to these voluntary enforceable undertakings. This is a situation that needs to be rectified before CASA can be given the power over such agreements. The second reading amendment moved by the shadow minister the member for Batman deals with this concern. The ANAO identified a number of concerns about CASA's ability to adequately cope with the increased powers this piece of legislation would give it. The second reading amendment asks the House to defer this bill until such time as CASA can demonstrate that it has dealt with the concerns raised by the Audit Office. It is important that the House take note of the amendment, so I shall read it:

“the House is of the opinion that the bill should not be proceeded with until:

(1)the Minister satisfies this House that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority has resolved all concerns raised in the Australian National Audit Office Report on Aviation Safety Compliance issued in November 1999;

(2)the Minister satisfies this House that CASA has especially heeded and acted upon the ANAO warning of the need for CASA to improve the management and the prioritisation of tasks in its surveillance program, before using the proposed voluntary enforceable undertakings power proposed in the Bill; and

(3)the Minister convinces this House that he has a clear and effective plan to ensure CASA fulfils its responsibility to rigorously and effectively regulate aviation in the interests of the Australian travelling public.”

In other words, wait and work on the problems that currently exist before giving CASA increased power over and above the powers it is struggling with at the moment. The bill has already been dropped once, because it was flawed and because CASA was not ready anyway. It is still not ready and so we should not proceed with this bill.

The issue of aircraft maintenance and safety standards is, needless to say, a vital one. I serve on the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Communications, Transport and the Arts. A number of other speakers who have also served on that committee have used some of the reports that that committee has brought down to support their case in this debate. The committee recently released a very important and comprehensive report into fatigue in the transport industry. In that report, the issue of aircraft maintenance was raised. As I said earlier, Australia maintains a very high level of safety, but this is under threat. There are fewer and fewer apprentices being trained, and more and more we are seeing the maintenance of aircraft taking place overseas. That means less control over standards. Giving the power to CASA to engage in article 83bis agreements will simply give more control over safety to overseas authorities. Fewer apprentices and smaller maintenance crews in Australia means longer hours, more stress and more mistakes in the maintenance sector. I refer to a recommendation in the report I mentioned, Beyond the midnight oil: managing fatigue in the transport industry. Related to recommendation 9, paragraph 2.116 refers to the issue of the lack of training of apprentices in the industry. The report, which is a bipartisan report of this parliament, says:

On a related matter, we are most disturbed to learn that both major airlines have dramatically reduced their intake of aircraft maintenance apprentices. This is leading the airlines to recruit engineers from overseas and to `poach' qualified staff from elsewhere in the industry. This practice, if continued, will:

place at risk the strong corporate and safety cultures that the airlines have established and maintained by training their own staff;

reduce Australia's capacity to be self-sufficient in this important part of the industry; and

reduce the number of qualified staff in other parts of the industry, particularly in regional areas.

For the first time in history, Qantas is finding its aircraft in ditches at the end of Bangkok runways, and we all recall the farcical situation of Ansett taking several aircraft out of action at the height of the Christmas rush because it failed to complete routine maintenance checks. CASA is not doing its job properly at the moment. It has been criticised by just about everybody in the industry as well as by the Australian National Audit Office, and yet this minister proposes to give it even more power through this bill. The minister also proposes to give aircraft operators an easy way out with an `I didn't know' defence when maintenance standards are not met. It gives the power to CASA to enter into agreements whereby safety standards for Australian aircraft will not be controlled by Australians but by other national authorities, whose standards may well not be as high as ours or as high as we would like. We are farming out most of our maintenance to other countries and not employing maintenance crews locally, and those we do employ locally are overworked, stressed and fatigued because we are simply not training anybody else to take over.

There is a chronic shortage of maintenance personnel not only in this country but also worldwide. The shortage has been placed as high as 30,000. It is a very dangerous position for the world aviation authorities to be in when worldwide we are short of some 30,000 skilled workers in this industry. The decision to stop training apprentices in the industry here has had disastrous results, and I think it is a disgrace, because I had some close connections with the airline industry and with Qantas during the period of time that I was a trade union official and I had nothing but praise for the training of apprentices by that organisation. What has led them to discontinue this practice I am at a loss to know. As a result of this, Qantas had to travel to South Africa last year in search of maintenance personnel.

In today's economy the issue of cost cutting is all-important, and the pressures on our airlines to cut their operating costs and provide cheap air fares is extremely great. Unfortunately, making sure the lights are turned off when no-one is in the room will only get them so far. But cuts are being made to maintenance and therefore to safety, and this is unacceptable. Maintenance is increasingly being contracted out, which may help with the costs but does nothing for the workers' morale or for safety standards. When the dollar becomes more important than the lives of passengers we are in very dangerous territory.

Safety should come first, but with this bill the priority seems to be putting in place mechanisms whereby avoiding the blame becomes the primary focus. `It's not my problem', `It's not my responsibility', `It's not my fault' and `I don't know' are phrases we will hear a lot in the aviation industry should this bill pass. What is more, they will be let off the hook because these will be perfectly valid defences. I am afraid this is simply not good enough. I urge the House to support the amendment moved by the shadow minister and reject this bill.

Finally, I did not necessarily intend to localise the debate, but a number of other speakers have raised the issue of Sydney's second airport. I believe one member on the other side spent his whole 20-minute speech talking about Sydney's second airport, and I cannot recall him, in the time I was listening to him, referring to the bill at all. However, the difficulty that Sydney airport has relating to noise problems and safety—which, of course, is being considered in this debate—is a related matter and a major problem.

I have a personal involvement now. My daughter has an inner-city residence, and it is quite disconcerting, I will say, when visiting her to be standing on her front balcony and virtually see aircraft coming through the trees, as I can see the trees outside of this building. It gives you an impression that they are coming through the trees they are that low. So I relate to the concerns of the inner-city people about this problem. The problem is that the decision was made so long ago now—and this is the issue that people are losing sight of—the site selected for Sydney's second airport is now redundant, due to the rapid residential development in Western Sydney. I appreciate that some people have not actually got this message yet, but I feel quite sure they eventually will.

A further development is that only within the last few months the New South Wales state government has announced a massive new residential development on what was known as the ADI site at St Marys, which is quite near, as the crow flies, to the Badgerys Creek site. And as more people move to Western Sydney there will be more electorates created, both state and federal, and the people in these electorates will be voters, and they will not want large aircraft flying overhead. It is already an issue out in Western Sydney, but there will be a lot more electorates created a lot closer to the Badgerys Creek airport site than was ever envisaged when the site was first selected, and these people will always vote against an airport on that site. So the sooner that site is put out of mind the better, and the sooner the government and others look at alternate sites and alternate solutions to what I do recognise is a major problem the better off we will all be.

I put forward the solution that the safety and noise problems at KSA must involve rail. Governments over a period of time have neglected rail. We have put a lot of money into roads, we have put a lot of money into airports, but we are not putting very much into rail. I suggest the solution may well be either to improve our interstate rail system—and I was hoping, as I think other members were, that the very fast train concept would be an answer to that; and, while that project I think is off the drawing board at the moment, the government is looking at other very fast train concepts—so that there is less reliance on air travel to move people from state to state or to use a very fast train to link an international airport with an international airport outside of the Sydney basin. Perhaps a combination of those two suggestions would resolve the problems that we are all faced with. I am pleased to have spoken on this debate, and I again urge the House to support the second reading amendment moved by the member for Batman.

Mr O'KEEFE  (Burke) (12.21 p.m.) —Before I make my contribution on the Aviation Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2000 I would just like to state my support for the observations made at the end of the speech by my colleague the member for Greenway. I was personally deeply disappointed by the decision of the government to walk away from the very fast train project. I think the net summary of all of the decisions made on that day was that all the government did was maximise the sale price of Sydney airport. They said to whoever will be the tenderers for Sydney airport, `There's not going to be a second airport for you to deal with as competition. You're not going to have a very fast train to deal with as competition. You've got the airport all to yourself. You are the gateway to Australia.' This certainly will maximise the sale of the asset, but it does nothing to in any way address any of those transport logistical problems that my colleague has so eloquently laid out before the parliament.

In supporting the opposition's second reading amendment, I want to focus on a topic that relates in particular to item (3) of the amendment, where the shadow minister has moved that we ensure that:

... CASA fulfils its responsibility to rigorously and effectively regulate aviation in the interests of the Australian travelling public.

In that context, I want to talk about an issue which has attained high public prominence in the last two or three weeks and that is the now undeniable link between long haul flying and the incidence of deep vein thrombosis. It is true to say that my own interest in this topic has come to light following a health incident that I had late last year when I travelled as a member of a parliamentary delegation to South America. In the plane on the way I fell ill and, although in my case it did not result in a clot, the doctors and the people who attended me told me later that all the symptoms were the same as DVT and that I was very lucky, for particular reasons in my case, it did not reach that point. Even then, there was a little penny starting to drop that, `Gee, the doctors seem to know all about this.' But it still did not dawn on me that it was anyone other than just me or the isolated traveller.

It was not until I was in England five weeks later that I discovered that a British politician had developed a serious DVT in a long haul flight to New Zealand about 18 months previously and had collapsed, was taken to hospital and had almost died. As a result, the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee conducted the first—as far as I know—well-based investigation into this issue, other than what had been going on behind the scenes with the airlines. The day I was flying out of London I was confronted by a headline from the London Times, reporting on the House of Lords standing committee report that was due to be released that day. The thing that staggered me was their finding that from April 1999 to April 2000 there had been 142 deaths of people from deep vein thrombosis who had come off aircraft at either Heathrow or Gatwick airports. When I saw that, I thought, `This is staggering.' Of course, a lot of medical evidence has come out since then to show that this is only the tip of the iceberg.

So the cat is out of the bag. The first thing that we need to be aware of is that this is a very serious health and safety issue associated with long haul flights. As Australians we have a particular interest in it, because we are so far from anywhere else on the globe—just about all flights to Australia from the other continents are long haul flights. We have a big stake in this. That is why I have written to the Prime Minister, to the Minister for Transport and Regional Services and to the Minister for Health and Aged Care at the table putting forward some proposals that I think the government should be taking up to ensure that the interests of people flying on these long haul flights are properly taken account of. As the tourism industry now tells us, there is in the order of 20 million people a year flying in and out of Australia—so we are talking about a lot of people.

I am afraid that we have a few questions to answer here that I have not said anything about until yesterday because, quite frankly, I did not want to believe it. But I am now convinced that the airlines have known about this association between DVT and long haul flying—and have known about it for a long time. I am now convinced that they have had irrefutable evidence and that they have chosen not to act on it. I cannot help but draw the parallel with the tobacco industry, in which for many years senior executives denied the link between cancer and smoking even though they had research within their own companies that was telling them that there was such a link. I have also observed a parallel with the motor vehicle industry—as it used to be—where known defects in cars were allowed to stay out there rather than the fleet being recalled and the part being replaced, even though it could potentially lead to an accident and the death or serious injury of someone driving a car with a defective part.

I believe that we now have the same situation with the airlines. There are a number of surgeons and highly regarded health experts who are now coming out of the woodwork saying, `What is so strange about this? We have been writing about this in journals for 30 years. We have been putting our papers on the desks of the airline executives and saying to them, “For heaven's sake, here it is—at least tell passengers about it. At least give them some information so that they know the questions to ask.”' January this year, I have to say, was the first time that I had seen anything start to come out that you would say in any way meets that requirement. I think it is in very direct response from this report from the House of Lords published in November last year requiring, among other things, the airlines to tell passengers about the problem.

The four-point plan which I have put on the table is as follows—I have set this out in a letter to the Prime Minister and to other senior ministers with portfolio responsibilities in this area. First of all, I have said that personalised advice should be given to passengers on exercise, food, drink and health issues so that, when they buy the ticket and take the flight, they are aware of the potential for health risks associated with flying. That leads to the obvious next problem: who is going to provide that information? The Minister for Health and Aged Care does not want everybody rushing to their doctor, paying—on Medicare—for a consultation about how they protect themselves on flights. Clearly, airline staff and travel agents need to be in a position to give intelligent advice. Until about two weeks ago, the majority of them probably had never heard of it because nobody had told them, let alone know with any expertise what to say to their clients.

I say to the Prime Minister, the Minister for Transport and Regional Services, the Minister for Health and Aged Care and the industry: for heaven's sake, you need, very quickly, an intelligent information campaign to be made available to airline staff and to the travel industry so that people can be properly advised. I do not have the slightest doubt that we need a well-funded research program to which, I suggest, the industry should contribute substantially. Also, because of Australia's particular interest in having a safe and attractive long haul flight industry, it is in the interests of the Australian government to contribute to research into the irrefutable evidence, to show what are the smart solutions and what is the smart advice.

I have also drawn my own conclusion. I do not, for one minute, pretend to be a health expert or to say that my solution is the only solution, but I know two things. I have talked with the legal company handling the case on behalf of the people making the class action claim—I hasten to add that I am not a member of that class action. It would not be sustainable for me, as a member of parliament, to advocate this case if I were also part of the class action. As I have had communication with the legal firm, I am aware of the nature of the evidence and the cases. There are two common factors. One is a lack of space, but more importantly and significantly there is the lack of movement and exercise during a long flight. There have been cases of people sitting in the window seat who, because they have to climb over people sitting next to them to have a walk, out of consideration for those people stay still. Then they find they have a health problem. People can be reluctant to get up and walk around the aisles because food trolleys are coming down the aisles or they may be standing in front of other people who are trying to watch a movie. It all has to change. It is very clear that there has to be a structured way of providing for people to move around in the cabin while they are on a long haul flight.

I have proposed to the airlines that they take out the back row of seats near the toilets, knowing that everybody goes to the toilet two or three times during a long flight. They could take out the back row of seats and put in a bank of walking machines so that, when people go to the toilet, they can also have a five-minute walk. On a ratio of one machine to 50 passengers, that can be done by everybody once every three to 3½ hours. The airlines are already telling me the reasons why that cannot be done. I will talk that through with them. They are also coming up with the same lines which were used in the past by the tobacco industry and by the car industry: `There's no research to prove the link between flying and DVT.' What else do we expect them to say? It is just not going to fly. The fact is that the anecdotal evidence is now overwhelming. Irrefutable evidence is coming out from medical specialists who have been putting this on the table and from former pilots who know what has gone on in their aircraft during flights.

The cat is now out of the bag. People now know and are being informed that they have to move and exercise. At the moment, what is in Qantas and Ansett brochures? I am not singling out Qantas or Ansett. I have written to their chief executives and said that those airline groups are at both ends of one of the longest hauls of the lot. They fly a lot of passengers, either across to the US or over to Europe. Those airlines have a stake in being world leaders in finding solutions. So I say to those airlines, here is one proposal. Create the bank of exercise machines so that people can go down there and exercise, while not blocking up the aisles. That is part of the answer. There are lots of inventors and manufacturers now coming forward—I have had four since yesterday—with the products which they have proposed to the airlines, suggesting, `Why don't you put this in the pocket behind the seat for people to do this with their feet or that with their feet? That would help with the problem.' For the last 15 years, all these inventors have been told to go away. Now, the cat is out of the bag and there is going to have to be a response.

On Friday the key participants in this issue are meeting at a summit in Sydney. I have not been invited. That is fine by me, but they know what my proposals are. I say particularly to British Airways, Qantas, Air New Zealand and Ansett: put yourself out in front of this. Do not behave like the tobacco industry did or the car industry did, or the chemical industry did with pollution. Do not run around saying, `There's no research to prove the link; we don't believe it is a problem.' Admit the problem up-front. Inform people about it. Become part of a serious research effort for long-term solutions, and in the meantime think up some smart ways to provide structured exercise or movement for passengers on planes during these flights. As I said, the cat is out of the bag. The travelling public are now aware and they are now queueing up asking how to deal with this. You can see people in terminals now doing exercises, and the flight attendants union is reporting that people are standing up in aircraft now and walking around and making a real pest of themselves. Of course they are—they are trying to stay alive. So the airlines have to take a structured approach to this, and the proposal for the walking machines or similar exercise equipment in a confined space that people can go to seems to me to be a relatively cost-effective and practical solution to the problem. I will say this: the expenditure on doing that is nothing compared to the legal costs that are going to come from doing nothing more than simply telling people about it. I do not believe that embarking on an information campaign where you give people a brochure, show them a video and stick information on their tickets is going anywhere near far enough as a quality response to this issue. We will follow that on as we go.

That is the first time, to my knowledge, that this matter has been put on the table in the parliament. The Prime Minister has my letter. The transport minister has my letter. The health minister has my letter. In relation to this bill, I believe the Civil Aviation Safety Authority ought to be taking a direct interest in this issue. It is not just about whether planes are safe to fly; it is whether they are safe to fly in as well. CASA ought to be taking a measured response to making sure that the whole approach is of a much higher level than it has been to date. In supporting the opposition's amendment, I specifically draw attention to that particular phrase in our proposal. I relate it to the issue we are now all aware of, and that is the association between DVT and long haul flying. I call on the government to ensure that the response from the industry players at the summit this Friday and the follow-through are adequate and that they lead the world, which is an example I believe the airlines should be setting.

Mr McCLELLAND  (Barton) (12.41 p.m.) —I congratulate the member for Burke on his contribution to this debate on the Aviation Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2000, which is certainly well intentioned and made on the basis of his personal experience. I think the contribution of members from both sides in this debate has been well meaning. Aviation safety is a crucial issue to Australians. Of course, the distance between centres in our continent makes air travel very important, and air travel also connects us, very importantly, with the rest of the world. It is important that we get it right, and my contribution today will be focusing primarily on supporting the amendment moved by the shadow minister for transport, and in particular paragraph 3, which says essentially that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority should lift its game in terms of its role as a policer of aircraft and aviation safety rather than simply being an auditor of what takes place.

The focus of my contribution will be with respect to the findings of the then Bureau of Air Safety Investigation, now the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, in its report entitled The systematic investigation into factors underlying air safety occurrences in the Sydney terminal area airspace. That is of crucial interest to my constituents because my electorate of Barton abuts the southern and western rim of the airport and, if there is to be any accident, figures which I will go to in the course of this contribution show that most accidents—I think it is close to 80 per cent—occur within eight kilometres of an aerodrome. Residents living in my electorate very much have the potential to become victims in an air disaster, so I feel I have a responsibility to make my contribution to ensure that all government agencies and instrumentalities are doing their utmost in a completely objective and independent way to promote aviation safety.

Looking at the role of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, I note that the report found that it had four predominant roles. The first is to promulgate safety standards. The second is to review safety standards to ensure they continue to meet current needs. The third is to satisfy itself that service providers have the capability to meet the defined safety standards—aircraft safety as well as equipment and so forth. The fourth and final one, very importantly from my point of view, is to monitor the performance of service providers against both the safety standards and the service providers' own internal performance standards.

The report noted that one of the objectives of CASA is reinforcing aviation safety by regular review of safety management arrangements employed by Airservices Australia in order to monitor its safety performance, identify key risk factors and promote improvement in the system. Why I focus on the involvement of Airservices Australia and the role of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority in monitoring its conduct is because Airservices Australia developed the long-term operating plan for Sydney (Kingsford Smith) Airport. I recall John Sharp, minister for transport at the time, saying, when he was announcing the public consultation process to establish the plan, that the government was intending to introduce a long-term operating plan for reasons which were, and I think I can quote from memory, essentially political in nature—that is, that it wanted to shift the noise away from certain suburbs. It is common knowledge that the long-term operating plan has predominantly shifted aircraft noise away from the electorates of Bennelong and Bradfield. The significant thing is that in devising this long-term operating plan Airservices Australia—because of their involvement in it, I believe, and I think history has shown—cannot be objective in scrutinising what they are doing and certainly in scrutinising what they are doing from a safety point of view.

This is where the role of CASA appears to be so vitally important. As the Bureau of Air Safety Investigation report indicated:

There appears to be a degree of professional reluctance for CASA to provide clear guidance on what is expected of Airservices as an air service provider. This responsibility appears to largely devolve to Airservices to determine internally.

That is a crucially important finding because it is Airservices Australia that has a direct interest in or ownership of this long-term operating plan. So that reluctance of CASA to actually get in there and get amongst what Airservices Australia is doing is of real concern. I do not believe that the matters identified in the August 1998 report have been sufficiently addressed by any of the relevant agencies involved, or the government. I will go through some of these important findings to emphasise the safety consequences because the report stated:

Whilst the investigation gained a general sense that concerns were held by CASA about the safety implications of the rate and complexity of change—

this is changing all different modes of operation of the airport—

that the Sydney TCU controllers were being subject to, there also appeared to be a degree of reluctance to be more positive in bringing this concern to the attention of Airservices and in directing that quick and positive action be taken to redress the problem.

As I said, that is vitally important because unless and until the Civil Aviation Authority, with some boldness, is prepared to get in amongst what is happening at Sydney airport and the operation of the long-term operating plan, these problems will occur. For instance, the report that I have referred to focused on six instances where there had been a breakdown of separation between aircraft. In layman's terms, that means aircraft coming too close together and hence the risk of a collision.

In brief terms, the report found that an important and essential part of implementing the long-term operating plan was that, before each mode of operation of the plan was introduced, there needed to be a safety case as a precondition to the mode being implemented. That makes sense. But the investigation found that the preparation of the safety cases was flawed, that it was not done systematically and, moreover, that very few air traffic controllers understood the process of the safety cases. The report stated:

Three of [the] more senior controllers reported to the investigation team that the intent of the safety cases was compromised. One of these senior controllers put a similar view in writing to local Airservices Australia management. The controllers believed the LTOP safety case was flawed. They indicated that they were required to substantiate their perception of the risk of identified hazards in the safety case in response to pressure being applied by senior management for an early resolution that, in turn, was in response to the community noise lobby.

That is a vitally important finding. What they are saying is that they wanted to make their contribution as to their safety concerns, the complexities of managing all these changes, and that those officers of Airservices Australia—and indeed their senior management, under pressure, I believe, from Airservices Australia—were effectively cross-examining them. They were saying, `What do you mean when you say there is a safety concern?' In other words, they were trying to browbeat them to get them to withdraw or minimise their expression of safety concerns. That is why you need a completely independent and objective safety agency such as the Civil Aviation Safety Authority to step in and say, `Look, hold on, this should not be going on. This safety case should be conducted in an objective sense at arms-length.' In other words, I do not believe the Civil Aviation Safety Authority has implemented and undertaken their task without fear or favour.

Importantly, on this issue of what I believe is intimidation of air traffic controllers expressing their concerns, the investigation report continued:

They—

that is, the controllers—

considered that their arguments about the risks of identified hazards were substantially ignored. In addition, controllers claimed that some of those involved in the development and analysis of the LTOP—

the long-term operating plan—

including industry and community representatives, were not as familiar with air traffic control and aircraft flight principles and were therefore not as cognisant of the risks associated with the identified hazards.

There you have air traffic controllers involved on the ground implementing these dramatic changes in operations saying that their arguments were not being considered. In addition, what the report found was that these safety cases were being considered in respect of each proposed mode of operation, not of the combined effect of all these changed modes of operation. The other great concern with respect to the inadequacy of these safety cases—despite the long-term operating plan safety cases for both stages 1 and 2 of the implementation of the long-term operating plan—is that the report noted the potential hazard of the extent of change of procedures. The report recommended that an independent assessment be undertaken, including human factors, to determine capacity for further change. The report noted that no such study could be found to have been conducted for the stage 2 safety case. That is outrageous if the Civil Aviation Safety Authority had not ensured that the advice of an independent objective analysis be obtained and that it occur.

I have mentioned the effect of the safety cases before the implementation of the long-term operating plan at Sydney airport. The second aspect contained in the report was the effect of the frequency and number of changes to these various modes of operation. I think it is fair to say that the predominant purpose of the long-term operating plan is essentially to open up the east-west runway which cuts across two parallel runways. If you are putting in an intersection across a major highway with massive jets screaming down and being unable to stop, it goes without saying that you are going to be introducing complexity in the operation of not only pilots but of air traffic controllers. These are significant safety concerns. Aside from that particular mode of operation, the number of changes between the various modes was a significant concern. For instance, the report noted that in the period before 1995, before the current coalition government, there was an average of three mode changes per 17-hour period; in 1998, it was up to six mode changes per 17-hour period. I understand that those changes are now up to about nine per 17-hour period. The stress associated with these complexities and the frequency of mode changes was having a significant effect on morale. The report noted that once a mode change is accomplished, the ability for mental processing or the cognitive capability of a controller is reduced until such time as the new pattern of handling and directing traffic becomes familiar. These constant changes do impede the ability of air traffic controllers to function. They recognised that and, hence, morale was low. Ninety per cent of controllers interviewed said that. They specifically stated that the volume and complexity of the changes had caused poor morale.

We have talked about the safety cases and the nature and frequency of the changes—all are the responsibility of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority to supervise and have direct input into. They did not and they were flawed. The third area is in respect of the training of air traffic controllers. The report noted that training to prepare these controllers for the complexity of air space management, using the crossing runways and the more complex modes of the long-term operating plan, is considered to have been inadequate. Refresher training had not been carried out. I understand that that has now at least been partially addressed. Again, it was only addressed as a result of the intervention of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, not as a result of the actions of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.

I can demonstrate, if you like, the lack of fortitude of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority in respect of a major recommendation of the 1978 report. That recommendation was that a review be undertaken of the system that operated at Sydney (Kingsford Smith) Airport where planes could land and take off in crosswinds of up to 25 knots and with a downwind component of five knots. It has been acknowledged that that exceeds the international standard of a 15 knots crosswind. It was reported that an incident had occurred at the Amsterdam airport, an accident involving a Boeing 757 veering off the runway whilst the flight crew was attempting to land in similar crosswind conditions of 25 knots. So it recommended that that situation be considered and further reviewed. What did we have in response to that recommendation of reviewing the crosswinds? In response to a question on notice on 17 February 2000, the minister reported to me that CASA undertook a review of the 25 knots crosswind criterion, which involved consultation with air services, the aviation industry and pilots associations. Following that review, CASA indicated that it considered that the practice of routinely operating runways with up to 25 knots of crosswinds before initiating a change of nominated runway does `not pose an unacceptable safety hazard'. That is outrageous. They are more concerned with facilitating the use of these crossing runway modes of operation than they are about achieving an international standard.

It is pleasing to see that the International Airline Pilots Association marked Sydney (Kingsford Smith) Airport with a red spot because of concerns with the long-term operating plan and in particular the effective compulsion to use it in crosswinds of 25 knots. As a consequence of that pressure—indeed, I asked other questions about where incidents involving crosswind accidents around the globe had been revealed—the minister, again with the input of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, eventually reduced that to 20 knots. I still believe that is inadequate—I still believe that it should be reduced to 15 knots—but I give the crosswind example to show how inadequate the view of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority is to vital safety matters. (Time expired)

Ms GILLARD  (Lalor) (1.01 p.m.) —It is a pleasure to speak in this debate today on the Aviation Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2000 and to speak in support of the second reading amendment moved by the member for Batman. I remind the House that the second reading amendment moved by the member for Batman calls on this House to express the opinion that the bill should not be proceeded with until the Minister for Transport and Regional Services satisfies this House that he is properly acquitting his responsibilities in relation to three specific areas, and I remind the House that those three areas are:

(1)the Minister satisfies this House that the Civil Aviation Safety Authority has resolved all concerns raised in the Australian National Audit Office Report on Aviation Safety Compliance;

(2)the Minister satisfies this House that CASA has especially heeded and acted upon the ANAO warning of the need for CASA to improve the management and the prioritisation of tasks in its surveillance program ... and

(3)the Minister convinces this House that he has a clear and effective plan to ensure CASA fulfils its responsibility to rigorously and effectively regulate aviation in the interests of the Australian travelling public.

Mr Deputy Speaker Mossfield, I noted your contribution to this debate with interest. I think you would recognise that in the course of this debate members in this House have expressed concern about a number of other areas connected with the portfolio of the Minister for Transport and Regional Services. Three issues have been specifically dealt with in the second reading amendment, but members in this place have raised other issues during the debate today.

I would like to add one more area of concern and that is this government's lack of regard for proper aviation planning for the state of Victoria. Members in this House may be aware—certainly the Victorian members would be aware—that this government has had to consider two issues related to aviation in Victoria; namely, the future of Essendon Airport and the future of the Point Cook air base. Let me say at the outset that, while these are issues of a different nature, they are both centrally related to aviation. Essendon Airport is an obviously busy commercial airport and there has been a long-running debate in the state of Victoria about the compatibility of that function—being a busy commercial airport—with the nature of the urban development that has occurred around the Essendon Airport site. The Point Cook issue is a different one. Point Cook is an Air Force base which the Commonwealth has marked for disposition. The debate about its future use is not premised on commercial considerations as such. The debate about its future use is premised on its heritage value as the birthplace of the RAAF. I will say a little bit more about that later.

Coming to the question of Essendon in particular, you would hope that, in weighing in the balance a major decision—like whether or not Essendon Airport should continue to function as an airport or should be closed as an airport and have the flights that currently land there moved to other locations—a government faced with a major policy decision of that nature would take the trouble to work in consultation with the state government, take the trouble to review aviation strategy generally in Victoria, take the trouble to consult with the people who will be affected by the decision, and take the time and care needed to make a rational decision premised on research. You would hope that at the end of that sort of process we would get the best possible decision about aviation strategy in Victoria and the best possible decision about the future of Essendon Airport and aviation matters generally. You would hope that that would be the process. But, of course, you would be mistaken, because that was not the process that this government undertook in making its decision about the future of Essendon.

I am aware from answers supplied to me to questions on notice from the Minister for Finance and Administration that as early as 13 January last year the Minister for Finance and Administration wrote to the Victorian Premier and advised that the Commonwealth had a short- to medium-term goal of disposing of both the Essendon Airport site and the Point Cook airfield. The Minister for Finance and Administration in answer to questions from me has verified that the Victorian Premier wrote back to the Minister for Finance and Administration on 11 February 2000 advising that the Victorian government had a policy to have the Essendon Airport site closed. The Minister for Finance and Administration has also verified to me that he was aware that the Victorian government was in the process of reviewing aviation issues in the Port Phillip basin.

One would have thought that, having started out on that path, the rational thing for the Minister for Finance and Administration and indeed the whole Howard government to do would have been to have continued to work in partnership with the Victorian government to resolve this issue and hopefully the issue of the Point Cook site as well and, in doing so, to allow the aviation study, which the Victorian government had commissioned, to be brought to a conclusion so it could inform the decision. As members may recall, that is not what happened. What happened is that, having embarked down a path where the Victorian government was at least consulted by way of letter from the Minister for Finance and Administration, the Howard government did not wait for that process of work with the state government to reach its logical conclusion, did not wait for the aviation study to become available.

Instead, the Minister for Transport and Regional Services, the Deputy Prime Minister, in answer to a question without notice during question time on 31 October last year, leapt up and, apparently not needing to be troubled with the facts, had made the decision that Essendon Airport was to stay open. In his answer, he stated:

As a matter of fact, because of the lobbying and concerns that have been expressed—

and in this case he is talking about the concerns expressed by the member for Corangamite, who asked him the question, on behalf of regional Victorians—

I could hardly not be aware of the importance of the Essendon Airport.

He then goes on to discuss the importance of that airport for country Victorians. He then announced that the Howard government had decided that Essendon Airport would remain open as an operational airport, that the government would sell its shares in Essendon Airport Ltd and that the company, EAL, which has a 50-year lease over the airport, would be sold to a purchaser who would be required to continue operating the site as an airport. Without due regard to getting the concluded views of the Victorian government and without due regard to getting the aviation study which was being undertaken by the Victorian government, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister for Transport and Regional Services, announced to this House on 31 October that Essendon Airport was going to stay open and function as an airport for the next 50 years.

It is no surprise that he specifically mentioned in the course of making that announcement that he had received a lot of representations on the question, and he expressed those representations to be from Victorian country members. The community in the country are very important in terms of making any decision. I would have suggested that those views should have been weighed against the views emerging from the state government and against the information to be gained from a rational aviation study. But, no, this government decides that it will keep Essendon Airport open, we presume, and in line with the minister's answer, because it wanted to respond to political pressure from country Victoria.

Having heard the minister for transport, the Deputy Prime Minister, make that announcement on 31 October, I sought to explore the nature of that announcement with him by way of a question on notice which I placed on the Notice Paper on 8 November. I would like to specifically state that this question on notice, which was question 2146, was addressed to the Minister for Transport and Regional Services and asked him a series of questions about the announcement he made during question time. So you would have thought there could be nothing more central to his portfolio than being asked questions about an announcement he himself had chosen to make. One of the questions I asked him—question No. 4—was:

Was the Victorian opposition

that is, the Liberal opposition

informed of the decision prior to its announcement in parliament on 31 October 2000 and, if so, on what date and at what time was the Victorian opposition informed, who made the contact with the Victorian opposition and who was contacted.

To my surprise, I have received answers to that series of questions on notice that are numbered 2146, but the answers that I have received have come from the minister for finance. So I asked the minister for transport a series of questions about an announcement he has made during question time and he determines, apparently, that these questions are best answered by the minister for finance. I am advised that the questions were transferred from Transport to the finance minister on 15 November, having been put on notice on 8 November. You would have to say that that is a very curious process and one I think that the minister might care to explain to this House. Why is it that if you ask the minister for transport questions about an announcement he has made in question time he finds himself unable to answer the questions and he gives the questions to someone else to answer, in this case the minister for finance?

Interestingly, in answer to question 4 about the nature of the information, if any, given to the Victorian opposition, the answer that he has received from the Minister for Finance and Administration in relation to those contacts with the Victorian opposition is, `Not so far as I or my office are aware.' So the Minister for Finance and Administration is basically saying he and his office know nothing about it.

But that is not really very probative of much, because the reason I asked the Minister for Transport and Regional Services about this decision is that he made the announcement. If anybody was informing the Victorian opposition about the announcement prior to this House being informed, you would think that person was in the office of the minister for transport, and the minister for transport has chosen not to answer this question. So my simple point is: in relation to this issue, which is an important issue about protocols and information, the minister for transport really ought to come into this House and let us know whether in respect of the Essendon Airport announcement made in this House on 31 October the Victorian opposition was informed prior to this House being informed. It is a question that he has been asked and I think it is a question he should answer.

Moving from that point, which is one that concerns me deeply, the issue of the Essendon Airport, I turn to the issue of Point Cook. As I indicated at the outset, there are two main aviation issues in Victoria. One is the future of the Essendon Airport and the other is the future of the Point Cook air base. I indicated to you at the commencement of this speech that the future of the Point Cook air base is fundamentally a heritage issue. If I can take honourable members briefly to the heritage matters which pertain to the Point Cook air base, because it is a very important site. The Point Cook air base is in my electorate and I visit it frequently. It is, in fact, the oldest operational airfield in the world. It might seem remarkable that Australia has the oldest operational airfield in the world that is still being used as an airfield, but we do. Given that we do, one would think that it is appropriate that an asset of that nature—something that has the reputation for being the oldest operational airfield in the world, that is still functioning as an airfield—ought to be retained and continue to function as an airfield.

The merits of the Point Cook site in heritage terms do not end there. Point Cook was established in 1913 as the Central Flying School and it was the birthplace of the Australian Flying Corps and the Royal Australian Air Force. I think I need to put those dates into context. Point Cook was established in 1913, and the first personed flight ever took place in 1903. So some 10 years after human beings found that they could fly with the right technology, there we were having flights taking place out of Point Cook. Point Cook was the departure point for the first north-south and first east-west crossings of the continent by air and was the departure point for the first aerial circumnavigation of the content.

If members go to Point Cook today, they will find that heritage history is all around them, because some of the old hangars are there, planes still take off from there and, most importantly of all, the RAAF museum is located there and its mission is to guard the history of the RAAF. One can go to the museum and see not only static displays of historic aircraft but also, because the museum is located at a functioning airfield, historic planes take off and land. So the whole site is involved in heritage aviation activities. I should say that Point Cook is also home to the RAAF chapel, and I think that that is very important too in terms of the heritage and culture of our Air Force.

The Commonwealth, having marked this site for disposal, now seems to be bereft of a plan as to what to do next. In those circumstances—where the Commonwealth seems bereft of a plan as to what to do next—as usually happens when a government stalls, the community provides the answer. There is a not-for-profit company called Point Cook Operations Ltd formed by a number of businesspeople and aviators. They have formed that not-for-profit company because they are interested in preserving the heritage of Point Cook and they are interested in taking over the management of the site. They are saying to the Commonwealth, `If you conveyed the site to us'—whether that be by way of lease or some other arrangement—`we would alleviate the Commonwealth of the recurrent costs of the site; we would preserve the heritage value of the site; we would further develop the RAAF museum and we would ensure that this place, Point Cook, with its heritage value, became an established long-term asset not only for the western region of Melbourne but also for Australia. We would have a prestige heritage aviation facility.'

I raise this matter today obviously because of its relationship to aviation. It is particularly important to raise it because it seems to me that, in terms of the government picking up this very sensible idea to act and to define a future for Point Cook and to define that future based around the plan of Point Cook Operations Ltd, there is really a window of opportunity for the government to do that in a way which makes very good sense in terms of heritage issues. I am sure many members in this place would be aware that next week we have in Victoria the International Air Show 2001at Avalon. The theme of that air show is celebrating the Centenary of Federation—which, of course, we are—and celebrating the 80th birthday, if I can use that term, of the RAAF. So we have an international air show taking place steeped in the Centenary of Federation history and the 80th birthday of the RAAF.

Can I suggest to the incoming Minister for Defence, Mr Peter Reith, that there would be no better time and no better place to announce that the heritage of Point Cook will be saved and preserved than at that air show. That is the moment to do it—when aviation celebrations in Australia for the Centenary of Federation and for the 80th birthday of the RAAF are under way. I raised this yesterday and I am raising it again because it seems to me that it would be a crying shame if this opportunity passed by. I am sure that the incoming Minister for Defence has a lot of issues to get across in his portfolio. I appreciate that it is a new portfolio responsibility for him and I appreciate that the Point Cook issue might not have been top of the pile. Having said that, I urge him to put the Point Cook issue at the top of the pile and to make sure that he comes to the air show at Avalon ready to make an announcement about the future of Point Cook, and that announcement ought to be one where he says to the Australian community and to the aviation community, which will be well represented at the air show, that this government is prepared to recognise the history of Point Cook, prepared to convey the site to a community-based entity, namely Point Cook Operations Ltd, and prepared to see the site preserved and developed in a way which will bring great credit to Australia and, of course, great credit to the western region of Melbourne.

I return to the second reading amendment moved by the member for Batman. As I noted at the outset of this speech, the second-reading amendment calls on this House to form the opinion that the bill should not be proceeded with until the minister for transport is able to satisfy this House that he has properly addressed a number of areas of key concern within his portfolio. I would urge all members of the house to support that second-reading amendment.

Mr BRUCE SCOTT  (Maranoa—Minister for Veterans' Affairs and Minister Assisting the Minister for Defence) (1.21 p.m.) —Acting as Deputy Prime Minister and minister for transport this afternoon is a great pleasure for me. I acknowledge the contributions by members. I am particularly interested in the opposition talking up the air show to be held at Avalon next week—a great air show.

Mr Martin Ferguson —Point Cook, too.

Mr BRUCE SCOTT —I have a great affection for Point Cook. In fact, my father is a graduate of Point Cook. I was most interested in the contribution of the member for Lalor. I thank all members for their contributions to this debate.

The member for Batman expressed some concern about the 83bis agreements, which are agreements which would allow another air safety authority to take over the regulation of a specific aircraft. I inform the member for Batman that, for example, CASA regulates an Australian aircraft that is based in Canada. It would make a lot of sense to give the Canadians the immediate regulatory oversight of this aircraft.

There will be no change to CASA's statutory responsibilities and it will not be able to lower aviation safety standards by entering into article 83bis agreements. We are developing regulations to cover the technical and administrative aspects of these agreements which will of course be tabled for the scrutiny of the house and the honourable member. I am pleased that the member for Batman does not have an in-principle objection to enforceable voluntary undertakings. As the Auditor-General's report recognised, they are a valuable addition to the range of enforcement tools that are available to CASA.

The member for Batman has moved a lengthy second-reading stage amendment. I can advise the House that CASA has improved its surveillance program dramatically. CASA has now moved to a systems approach to surveillance which has been successfully introduced initially in relation to high-capacity airline operations and subsequently for low-capacity RBT operations.

The systems audit approach will raise the consistent application of safe practices in the industry. It will also help CASA assess the operators' understanding of the regulations and other safety requirements, helping CASA to: firstly, assess the intrinsic ability of the operator to comply with safety requirements; secondly, to develop better education models to improve understanding of safety requirements; and, thirdly, assess the need to review regulations to ensure that they keep up with new learning. The approach will also lead to continuous safety improvements as operators assess their processes and procedures through their own monitoring and also corrective and preventive action systems.

In adopting this safety management system audit approach to surveillance, CASA is keeping at the forefront of international best practice. The world's major civil aviation regulators are also adopting an approach to surveillance which will spearhead the drive for safer airline operations well into this century. I commend the bill to the House. At the same time, I present the correction to the original explanatory memorandum.

Question put:

That the words proposed to be omitted (Mr Martin Ferguson's amendment) stand part of the question.

The House divided. [1.30 p.m.]

(Mr Deputy Speaker—Mr F.W. Mossfield)

Ayes............	74
Noes............	56
Majority.........	18

AYES

 

Abbott, A.J.	Andrews, K.J.
Anthony, L.J.	Bailey, F.E.
Baird, B.G.	Barresi, P.A.
Bartlett, K.J.	Billson, B.F.
Bishop, B.K.	Bishop, J.I.
Brough, M.T.	Cadman, A.G.
Cameron, R.A.	Causley, I.R.
Charles, R.E.	Downer, A.J.G.
Draper, P.	Elson, K.S.
Entsch, W.G.	Fischer, T.A.
Forrest, J.A *	Gallus, C.A.
Gambaro, T.	Gash, J.
Georgiou, P.	Haase, B.W.
Hardgrave, G.D.	Hawker, D.P.M.
Hockey, J.B.	Hull, K.E.
Jull, D.F.	Katter, R.C.
Kelly, D.M.	Kelly, J.M.
Kemp, D.A.	Lawler, A.J.
Lieberman, L.S.	Lindsay, P.J.
Lloyd, J.E.	Macfarlane, I.E.
May, M.A.	McArthur, S *
McGauran, P.J.	Moylan, J. E.
Nairn, G. R.	Nehl, G. B.
Nelson, B.J.	Neville, P.C.
Nugent, P.E.	Prosser, G.D.
Pyne, C.	Reith, P.K.
Ronaldson, M.J.C.	Ruddock, P.M.
Schultz, A.	Scott, B.C.
Secker, P.D.	Slipper, P.N.
Somlyay, A.M.	Southcott, A.J.
St Clair, S.R.	Stone, S.N.
Sullivan, K.J.M.	Thompson, C.P.
Thomson, A.P.	Truss, W.E.
Tuckey, C.W.	Vaile, M.A.J.
Vale, D.S.	Wakelin, B.H.
Washer, M.J.	Williams, D.R.
Wooldridge, M.R.L.	Worth, P.M.

NOES

Mr BRUCE SCOTT  (Maranoa—Minister for Veterans' Affairs and Minister Assisting the Minister for Defence) (1.35 p.m.) —by leave—I present a supplementary explanatory memorandum. I move government amendments Nos 1 to 6 as circulated:

(1)Clause 2, page 1 (line 8), omit “subsection (2)”, substitute “this section”.

(2)Clause 2, page 1 (after line 9), after subclause (1), insert:

(1A)Item 17 of Schedule 1 commences on a day to be fixed by Proclamation.

(3)Schedule 1, page 4 (after line 4), after item 5, insert:

5A Subsection 20AA(2)

Omit “subsection (1)”, substitute “subsection (1A)”.

(4)Schedule 1, item 6, page 4 (line 7), omit “operator or pilot”, substitute “owner, operator, hirer (other than the Crown) or pilot”.

(5)Schedule 1, item 6, page 4 (line 17), omit “operator or pilot”, substitute “owner, operator, hirer (other than the Crown) or pilot”.

(6)Schedule 1, item 6, page 4 (line 21), omit subparagraph (i), substitute:

(i)there is outstanding a requirement imposed by or under the regulations in relation to the maintenance of the aircraft;

The government is seeking to make a number of amendments to the Aviation Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2000. The main government amendment provides that the proposed new section 31A of the Civil Aviation Act commence upon proclamation. Postponing the introduction of CASA's proposed scheme of voluntary undertakings until proclamation will ensure that CASA has adequate time to develop procedures and training for its staff in relation to enforceable voluntary undertakings.

The government is committed to ensuring that CASA has addressed the Australian National Audit Office, ANAO, concerns about the implementation of the scheme and is adequately prepared. In an audit of CASA's aviation safety compliance functions, the ANAO was particularly concerned about CASA's management of its surveillance program, and there are still technical and personal issues to be resolved in relation to enforceable policy.

Other amendments to the bill include two corrections and a clarification that the term `maintenance requirement' refers to any maintenance requirement imposed by or under the civil aviation regulations, including any instruction or direction by CASA under the regulation. The two corrections address a numbering error and a error in deleting owners and their hirers from the airworthiness requirements in subsection 20AA(3) and (4) of the Civil Aviation Act in the bill. The deletion was due to an error in developing the drafting instructions and would have removed the owners and hirers from the chain of responsibility for maintenance. I commend the amendments to the House.

Mr MARTIN FERGUSON  (Batman) (1.37 p.m.) —At the outset, I would firstly indicate, as I did last evening, that the opposition has no particular objection to the government's amendments to the Aviation Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2000. We also acknowledge comments, made in response to issues raised by us last evening, that this is part and parcel of a recognition by Australia that we are part of a global aviation industry; and, for that reason, the intent of the changes sought by the government is supported by both sides of the House.

The real debate from our point of view is the question of whether some of the organisations that will be vested with the responsibility of implementing the intent of this bill actually have the capacity at this point in time to do the job expected of them by the parliament. On that note, I also indicate to the House that we understand and support the intent of the amendments of the bill going to the correction of a drafting error and also the proposed modification going to the introduction of voluntary enforceable undertakings. Despite the fact that we support the intent, we have some problems as to whether they are capable of being implemented at this point in time.

For those reasons, the opposition will be supporting the bill today. We have correctly divided on a second reading stage amendment, which the opposition moved last night, the object of which was to send a message to the government that, whilst we understand and support the intent of where it is going as a result of the aviation legislation before the House this afternoon, it has to have regard to the concerns raised in that second reading amendment, which will now also appropriately and comprehensively be examined by a Senate legislation committee with a view to bringing further to a head some of the issues that have been canvassed in the debate surrounding this bill.

However, as I indicated in my speech yesterday, we do retain significant concerns with aspects of the bill and how it may impact on aviation safety. What concerns me is that the government has also failed to take on board some of the issues that we raised in the course of the debate, especially in my initial contribution as shadow minister to the debate last night, in that it has not given answers to the questions I posed which go to the very nature of the bill and its operation.

We believe that if this legislation goes wrong it could have a major impact on the aviation industry and, more importantly, the question of aviation safety. I have already informed the House that the bill has been referred to a Senate legislation committee. I am also pleased to inform the House, and especially those who operate in the industry, that I understand the committee will conduct hearings on 2 March and will report by the end of March. I say to those who are actually involved in the industry and interested in its future and its capacity to operate in a global sense that they should take seriously that Senate reference to the legislation committee and go out of their way to make an objective and constructive contribution to consideration of this bill by the Senate legislation committee.

I will briefly reiterate some of our concerns with the bill. The first relates to article 83bis agreements, the concept of unfettered power. We all understand that this empowers CASA to enter article 83bis agreements on behalf of Australia. It is an important development. It is an important power delegated by this parliament and our nation to CASA to agree to exchange responsibilities with other nations with respect to air safety, aircraft maintenance and a variety of other issues. I note the response by the minister with respect to Australia and Canada. We all understand those types of arrangements. But what concerns us is that the minister has indicated that he will introduce regulations or guidelines for this power. So be it, but I am one who actually believes that, because of the significant nature of the changes embodied in the legislation before the House this afternoon, those regulations or guidelines should have been spelt out for the industry, the general public and the parliament as part of the comprehensive consideration of this bill this afternoon, not left in isolation for further development and consideration in a future debate. What I am suggesting in essence is that it all should have been on the table and concluded through full and proper consideration as part of this debate. (Extension of time granted)

For that very reason, there remains an outstanding need for a detailed consideration, following consultation with the aviation industry, of the nature of those regulations or guidelines. Perhaps the minister, who will follow me, can explain how he sees that operating and whether he proposes to facilitate consideration of this bill by the Senate legislation committee by actually placing before that committee the potential regulations or guidelines that will become part and parcel of the implementation of the changes that will no doubt be carried by the House today. If that is possible, I believe that could actually facilitate consideration by the Senate legislation committee of what is a very important bill and, in doing so, remove some of our potential fears as part of the parliamentary processes and also overcome some of the fears that exist in the industry in their consideration of where we go with the implementation of this bill.

Amended items 4 and 6, which go to the issue of what happens for non-compliance in essence of inadvertent breaches and the concept of knowingly or recklessly performing certain acts, are open to debate and clarification. We want to try to bring before the parliamentary processes a better understanding of where we are going in a regulatory sense on that issue. One could argue that we are buying a pig in a poke as to, for example, what the concept of knowingly or recklessly doing such acts actually means. No-one would want to leave that open to debate, if we can possibly avoid it by stepping back for a short period and going away and developing a better understanding of these issues.

The bill attempts to provide clarification in the act with respect to when a breach is a breach and not a noncompliance. As advised yesterday, the opposition believes the minister needs to now spell out a clear picture of the regulatory compliance options he intends for CASA. That is exceptionally important, because not only on this side of the House but also more and more in the industry there is growing concern, as expressed in the Audit Office report, about the capacity of CASA to do its job. I think this was even partly acknowledged by the minister today when he said in response to the debate that there are outstanding technical and personal issues to be resolved on enforcement policy with respect to the performance of CASA. That is in part an admission that not all is well with the operation of CASA at this point in time. I thank the minister for his acknowledgment that not all is well with the operation of CASA at the moment.

This part of the bill, together with the proposal to introduce voluntary enforceable undertakings, goes to the heart of CASA's operation. It is therefore of concern to the operation of the bill and to the opposition that this has been done in such a haphazard manner, as the bill has been. There have been industry concerns with how CASA is enforcing the act and how it is using its resources and powers. Therefore, any change to those powers like these amendments should be spelt out in a broad context so the industry in particular can be clear about where the regulator is coming from. That is only fair to the industry and it is only fair to the travelling public. For those reasons, it is appropriate that this matter now be more fully canvassed in the Senate's consideration of this legislation. In essence, the government is also on notice as a result of my contribution today that the opposition will be pursuing this again in the Senate legislative processes.

I now turn to item 33A, which raises that complex matter of voluntary enforceable undertakings. As I said earlier today, what worries us is the very vexed question of whether or not CASA is ready for these changes. I also believe that, if we go down this path, and it is part of the global development of the industry, the industry must be consulted in Australia. As the opposition said yesterday, parts of the industry and the Audit Office retain significant concerns with CASA's ability to use this power. There has been considerable debate about CASA's powers and how they are being used. Therefore, the issue is: does adding a new power without proper consultation add to the problems which surround the operation of CASA at the moment and whether or not such a proposal is wise in an environment in which there is concern about the operation of CASA? (Extension of time granted) For that reason, the opposition will again be pursuing this issue in the Senate legislation committee.

I say that because the amendments do not stop the implementation of the section of the bill that introduces voluntary enforceable undertakings. They merely put the timing of the commencement of this power in the hands of the minister. I must say in passing that this is a very important aviation bill, yet I am surprised that the minister himself, the Deputy Prime Minister, has not seen fit to come into the House as the responsible minister and deal with the bill. That is not to suggest that the minister at the table, the Minister for Veterans' Affairs, is not competent, but in the end he is personally not responsible for the eventual implementation of this bill. I would have thought that such an important bill as the Aviation Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2000 would have demanded the presence of the minister to deal with these issues.

The minister has said that he will allow CASA time to do the training necessary for this power. That is all very well. But, as we said yesterday, unfortunately we do not trust the minister's judgment. He only tempered the timing of CASA receiving this power when the opposition pointed out to him the audit report of last year. In essence, he was going to bring in these changes with no obligation on CASA to address the concerns raised and the requirement that it clean up its act in readiness for this power.

When you think about that in the context of the minister's response this afternoon to the debate, where he again acknowledged that there are outstanding issues arising from the audit office report, including technical and personnel issues, that contribution from the government side only adds to our concerns going to the changes in the capacity of CASA to do the job.

While the opposition supports the amendment because it gives some moderation to the introduction of this power, we will be rightfully—and as is our responsibility in opposition—poring over this issue in the Senate legislation committee. As a result of consideration of this issue in the Senate legislation committee, if we are not satisfied, and following further discussions by us with the industry, we may then feel it is appropriate that more substantial amendments be moved in the Senate. I think it is fair to say that the opposition basically supports the thrust of this bill. But we are correctly raising some concerns. In doing so, we are going out of our way to cooperate with the government but urge it over the next couple of weeks to actually go away and properly consider through the department the issues we have raised in an endeavour to actually bring back to the Senate legislation committee a fuller picture of where we might end up with respect to the regulations and the method of implementation and operation of the changes embodied in the bill.

The Senate legislation committee now has the responsibility for doing, I suppose, a fuller examination of the bill in a fit and proper way. I also note that there are other parts of the bill that I mentioned yesterday that will also receive attention. In some ways this bill has been a major disappointment. If we had an effective minister, he would be here this afternoon, because he would be focused on his portfolio and we would therefore not need to use the Senate to extract the information clarifying the policy changes that we have raised in this debate.

I would suggest to the House, in conclusion, that we saw a sloppy version of the bill last year, a patch up job this year and a clear endeavour by the government to just get it off the legislative timetable without sufficient explanation or information to tidy up what is a very important change in a fit and proper way. Having said that, for the right reasons we will vote for this bill, but we still have concerns. In the interests of good policy, I simply say to the government: please take on board what has been raised, endeavour to do the work and finalise completion of consideration of this issue in the Senate legislation committee so as to avoid the need for us to reconsider our position and potentially move further amendments to clarify potential messes created by the minister not being properly focused on his job.

Mr BRUCE SCOTT  (Maranoa—Minister for Veterans' Affairs and Minister Assisting the Minister for Defence) (1.53 p.m.) —If I could just answer a couple of the concerns that have been raised by the opposition spokesman, can I just say, firstly, in relation to the inability of the Deputy Prime Minister and minister to be with us here for this, I know that he would have liked to have been here but he has had leave of the House. I am sure the opposition would understand that the Deputy Prime Minister does have other issues of concern today as well as this, but he will be taking and has always taken a very close interest in the concerns that have been raised by the other side of the House. I note also his confirmation of my ability to pass this through the House today.

In relation to regulatory compliance, I say to the Opposition that CASA has a wide range of enforcement powers. Enforceable voluntary undertakings are not central to CASA's powers. They are an additional tool that will be useful in some circumstances. I could also advise the opposition that the government will be providing the Senate legislation committee with the drafting instructions for the regulations. I thank the opposition for its contribution and commend the bill to the House.

Amendments agreed to.

Bill, as amended, agreed to.